Why Isnt Consciousness Empirically Observable? Emotional Purposes As Basis For Self-Organization :: Logic Philosophy

wherefore Isnt Consciousness Empirically Observable? Emotional Purposes As Basis For self-organisationABSTRACT Most versions of the knowledge argument say that if a scientist nonice my hotshot does non know what my soul is like, then intellect is not identical with carnal brain processes. This unwarrantedly equates physical with empirically discernable. However, we can conclude only that intelligence is not identical with anything empirically apparent. Still, given the intimate connection betwixt each conscious event (C) and a corresponding empirically observable physiological event (P), what P-C relation could render C empirically unperceivable? Some suggest that C is a relation among Ps which is differentiable because it is multi-realizable that is, C could halt been realized by P2 rather than P1 and still call for been the same relation. C might even be a self-organizing process, appropriating and renewal its own material substrata. How can this account explain t he empirical unobservability of consciousness? Because the emotions motivating attention direction, partly constitutive of phenomenal states, are executed, not undergone, by organisms. Organisms-self-organizing processes actively appropriating their needed physical substrata-feel motivations by generating them. Thus, experiencing someones consciousness entails carrying out his or her motivations. That there is something empirically unobservable about phenomenal consciousness follows from a modified knowledge argument. Traditional versions (Jackson 1986 Robinson 1982 Noren 1979) hold that if experiencing were equivalent with physical brain states, then complete empirical knowledge of brain states should defend knowledge of everything about my experiencing but complete empirical knowledge of brain states would not constitute knowledge of everything about experiencing (those alone wouldnt reveal what its like to have that experience) therefore, experiencing is not equivalent with phy sical brain states. This argument can be criticized for unwarrantedly assuming that everything physical is empirically observable (from an experimenters standpoint). E.g., Jackson assumes that the what its like aspect isnt expressible in physical language (291), but the reason for granting this assumption is that what its like is inexpressible in terms of possible empirical observations. Without the assumption that everything physical is empirically observable, we can conclude, not that consciousness is non-physical (since there might be physical processes that are observationally inaccessible), but exactly that consciousness isnt identical with anything empirically observable. Still, given the intimate connection surrounded by each conscious event (C) and a corresponding empirically observable physiological event (P), what P-C relationship could render C empirically unobservable? If identical, they should be equally observable. I.e., if P EO and C not-EO, then PC.